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Court delay frustrates economic behavior. Surprisingly, the impact of a coherent jurisdiction for 
the timely resolution of legal disputes has so far received little attention in civil law countries. 
Consequently, this paper examines the nexus between court delay and the availability of legal 
precedents. We model litigation as a two-stage rent seeking game, and find that precedents curb 
strategic behavior. Thus, the excessive use of party resources in litigation, such as time, is reduced 
if a precedent is applicable. Using judge-level data of a German trial court, we provide first 
empirical evidence on the role of precedents for case disposition time and the probability of 
reversal in a civil law country. Our results show that the availability of precedents significantly 
contributes to a reduction in delay, and also decreases the probability of reversal. Interestingly, 
we find no such influence for the citation of legal literature in verdicts.  
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1. Introduction 
Court delay frustrates economic behavior. Individuals and firms may not perform otherwise 
favorable market transactions if friction leads to lengthy legal disputes. Societies without an 
effective enforcement mechanism will lack mutual trust and, eventually, economic 
prosperity. The causes and repercussions of delay in courtroom are, however, complex and 
difficult to explore. In the case of Germany, civil litigation numbers at trial courts have 
steadily fallen over the past 15 years, yet the average case disposition time has increased to 
just below 200 days (CEPEJ 2016).1 
It is widely agreed that the design of institutions is crucial to understanding court 
performance (see, e.g., KESSLER 1996, DI VITA 2010; VOIGT 2016), and that institutional 
variation explains regional and cross-country differences (see, among others, DJANKOV et 
al. 2003, BIELEN et al. 2015a). One particular institutional feature of continental Europe has 
yet received little attention in this regard: the legal doctrine of jurisprudence constante 
(‘ständige Rechtsprechung’). In contrast to the common law tradition, judicial decisions in 
civil law systems, like in Germany, have no binding authority. Under jurisprudence 
constante, the emergence of repeated and uniform court verdicts in analogous cases over 
time creates a persuasive impact on future judicial decisions. Consequently, court decisions 
may generate a legal certainty “that codifications have failed to achieve” (FON/PARISI 2006, 
p. 522). Nevertheless, adjudication evolves on demand, not gradually, and while such 
judicial law-making may have consolidated some subfields of law, other kinds of disputes 
lack previous jurisdiction and hang in the balance. Supposably, the mechanisms of court 
delay are thus interrelated with judicial decision-making and the development of legal 
precedents.  
This paper analyzes the nexus between the existence of legal precedents and case disposition 
time. We thus contribute to the growing literature on court delay and performance, and 
provide an empirical perspective to dispute resolution at the judge level for the case of 
Germany. As a theoretical reference, we specify a two-stage rent seeking game between the 
                                                 
1 For further details, see also STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT (2016b) and BUNDESAMT FÜR JUSTIZ (2016).  
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litigants and the judge in the tradition of TULLOCK (1975). Judges are motivated to decide 
correctly, and parties may use the resource time to improve their chances of winning the 
trial. Given this setting, we derive some implications for the use of resources by the parties 
with and without legal precedents. Using micro level data from a German trial court, we 
then provide empirical evidence for the hypothesized impact of precedent citation on case 
disposition time. We also explore the use of multiple and older precedents in judicial 
verdicts. An additional focus is the effect of cited precedents in a trial court decision on the 
probability of reversal by the higher instance court. Assuming that appeal courts are socially 
beneficial and interested in the correction of errors, we can derive some implications for 
trial court accuracy as well. 
The paper is organized as follows: in chapter 2, we provide a brief review of the literature 
on court delay. The theoretical framework is then presented in chapter 3. Chapter 4 
describes the available dataset and gives some descriptive statistics. In chapter 5, we present 
the regression model and discuss the basic results. Chapter 6 concludes. 
2. Related Literature 
The evaluation of court performance and thus the efficiency of the installed enforcement 
mechanisms have always been major topics in the law and economics literature. Several 
researchers have proposed different approaches to further categorize the broad term of 
court performance (see, among others, TULLOCK 1980, DAKOLIAS 1999, STAATS et. al. 2005, 
VOIGT 2016).2 In this context, we follow the growing literature on court delay. Researchers 
in this regard either analyze aggregate data on the output per court (or per judge), or study 
impact factors for the disposition time of individual cases at the micro-level. 
The first strand of empirical research concentrates on the output of courts. Output is often 
measured by clearance rates, congestion rates and average disposition time, and then 
applied to cross-court or cross-country analyses (e.g., BUSCAGLIA/ULEN 1997, DJANKOW et 
                                                 
2 STAATS et al. (2005), followed by VOIGT (2016) suggest to distinguish between five categories: judicial 
independence, court delay, accessibility, accountability, and court effectiveness. 
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al. 2003, BEENSTOCK/HAITOVSKY 2004, MITSOPOULOS/PELAGIDIS 2007, CHEMIN 2009, 
FALAVIGNA 2015, IPPOLITI et al. 2015). For instance, ROSALES-LOPÉZ (2008) applies an 
ANOVA approach on yearly case resolutions, workload and reversal rates of Spanish courts. 
She finds that an increase in case resolution per period did not necessarily lead to an increase 
in reversals. DIMITROVA-GRAJZL et al. (2016) study determinants of case disposition in 
Bulgarian courts and identify a major demand side influence on court output. The authors 
conclude that a legal policy that simply increases the size of the judiciary may not reduce 
case disposition time.  
The aggregate measures of court output have also been related to the individual judge (see, 
e.g. BAGUES/ESTEVE-VOLART 2010, CHOI et al. 2013, MELCARNE/RAMELLO 2015, COVIELLO et 
al. 2015). SCHNEIDER (2005) implemented a remarkably different approach to judicial 
performance, measuring the output of judges by case resolution and the extent of 
lawmaking. The author intents to account for the production of precedents, which “change 
the content of the law as applied in practice” (SCHNEIDER 2005, 130), by including the 
number of published decisions in the legal electronic database JURIS. SCHNEIDER (2005) 
finds that judges with a Ph.D. are more productive, but are also reversed more often. The 
authors suggests that Ph.D. judge more frequently dissent from precedents, and thus the 
reversal rate increases. Interestingly, his results also show that judges with a higher 
promotion probability are less productive and more often reversed. Due to the aggregate 
measures of judicial productivity, the effect of precedents on judicial behavior cannot be 
determined. Nevertheless, the use of the mentioned indirect proxies of court performance 
and court delay offers valuable insights on regional and country level. The use of aggregate 
data, however, always implies that the studies cannot draw further inference from 
peculiarities of the individual lawsuit.3  
                                                 
3 Furthermore, it may be difficult to draw inference from a change in an aggregate variable, and different 
output measures often relate to the same underlying micro variable. For instance, an increase in the clearance 
rate may be caused by more productive judges, or by less claims filed per period. 
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The second strand of research focuses on case-level determinants of court delay (see, among 
others, HEISE 2000, DI VITA 2012, ECONOMIDES et al. 2013, FENN/RICKMANN 2013). Several 
studies have revealed that legal representation by advocates, multiple parties on defendant 
or plaintiff side, the number of witnesses, oral hearings and the use of expert opinions 
significantly increase case disposition time (PRIEST 1989, BIELEN et al. 2015b, GRAJZL/ZAJC 
2016). Furthermore, the identity of the judge may play a role for trial length. RAMSEYER 
(2012) provides evidences for a strong impact of elite education on judicial productivity and 
speed in handling cases. He also suggests that experience does matter less for the individual 
judge, but more on the institutional level (the court). BIELEN et al. 2016 analyze data from 
a Belgian trial court and observe a positive effect of the judge´s age and a negative effect of 
job experience on case disposition time. Examining a twenty-five year sample from US 
appeal courts, CHRISTENSEN/SZMER (2012) determines both factors to prolong trials, though 
only experience (tenure) is significant. Other studies have identified a relevant impact of 
court organization and procedure. DALTON (2009) reveals an interaction between court size 
and number of attorneys, with larger courts working in a more efficient way with few 
advocates and, surprisingly, vice versa. FENN/RICKMANN (1999) study medical malpractice 
claims and find an increased duration of lawsuits if legal aid was provided to one party.  
Micro-level analysis provides fruitful insights into case-specific and procedural impact 
factors for court delay, but is often driven by data availability. Another, more subtle 
peculiarity of a tried case is difficult to identify for researchers: the existence of previous 
jurisdiction to the legal conflict at hand. Nevertheless, a precedent is likely to affect the 
judge handling the case, and the behavior of the litigants (if they are aware of the 
precedent). It is reasonable to assume that the impact of precedents on court delay should 
thus manifest on the case-level. However, we are not aware of any empirical study that 
determines the effect of precedents on the handling of cases and court delay.4  
                                                 
4 Several studies examine the effect of published decisions on the reputation of the judge and his influence 
among the judiciary (e.g. MCCORMICK/PRASKACH 1996, SOLIMINE et al. 1998, KLEIN/MORRISROE 1999, 
SMYTH/BHATTACHARYA 2003, CHOI et al. 2011), but do not focus on court performance. Similarly, the study of 
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3. A Model of Court Delay and Precedents 
3.1 Setup 
Rent-seeking games (e.g., TULLOCK 1975) provide a basic framework for the analysis of court 
proceedings when litigants behave strategically. In these models, parties seek to obtain a 
common rent, the disputed value, and can influence the probability of winning with private 
effort. It is the well-known contribution of this literature to show that total resources spent 
in such games may consume a major part of the rent while the probability of success remains 
unchanged in equilibrium. Rent-seeking games primarily capture the adversary nature of a 
legal dispute, and resemble a “trial by battle” (TULLOCK 1975, p.746). 
In order to analyze effects on court delay, the effort of each litigant is interpreted as the 
time spent on the case, such as to write statements of claims, rebut allegations of the 
opposing party, assemble favorable evidence, prepare witnesses and attend court hearings. 
Thus, time spent on a legal dispute produces an inefficiency (delay) when court accuracy, 
that is the probability of a correct verdict, remains unaffected. We will now apply an 
adaptation of the TULLOCK (1975) model to study litigation and delay under a civil law 
regime. 
Consider a litigation game with three players, the litigants Mr. Right and Mr. Wrong, and 
the Judge. We assume a complete information setup, and all players are risk-neutral. 
Mr. Right and Mr. Wrong may exert costly effort to increase their probability of winning 
the case. While the decision of the judge implies uncertainty, the names of the litigants in 
this article indicate to the reader that Mr. Right should prevail in court if the judicial 
decision was perfectly accurate. Reflecting the inquisitorial nature of civil law countries, 
the judge can increase accuracy by taking more time to evaluate the presented evidence and 
                                                 
LANDES/POSNER (1976) offers resourceful insights into the formation and depreciation of precedents, but does not 
connect precedents to court performance. 
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assess the legal situation. In this non-cooperative game, all players maximize expected 
returns and choose optimal effort.   
For reasons of simplicity, we assume that initially both litigants have the same probability 
of winning the case. Furthermore, Mr. Right and Mr. Wrong are equally able to increase 
their chance of success, given that the judges exerts no judicial effort to evaluate the 
presented claims. The probability of winning for Mr. Right can thus be written as 
WRJ
RJ


 
with 0, WR , 0WR  and 1J . Mr. Wrong then wins with probability 
WRJ
W
 .The 
time spent on the case by Mr. Right (Mr. Wrong) is captured by the variable R (W) and is, 
trivially, nonnegative. Furthermore, at least one party should show positive effort, as 
litigation procedures always require one party to file the suit. The judicial effort (J) in 
evaluating the case obviously increases the probability that Mr. Right prevails, and makes 
his effort in persuading the judge also more effective. Symmetrically, the more the judge 
studies the legal case and the provided evidence, the less effective is the effort of Mr. Wrong 
in achieving a favorable verdict. Given this setup, the court is fully arbitrary if J = 1 and 
parties exert the same effort in equilibrium. Assuming that the court cannot perform worse 
than throwing dice, it follows that J ≥ 1. 
The timing of the presented litigation game is divided into two stages, as displayed in Fig. 1: 
the legal battle of the litigants (stage 1), and the decision-making of the judge (stage 2). At 
stage 1, Mr. Right and Mr. Wrong enter the rent-seeking game and choose their effort R 
and W simultaneously. Both litigants have to form rational expectations about the behavior 
of the adversary, and the evaluation effort of the judge. At stage 2, the judge then assesses 
the presented evidence and chooses his judicial effort J in order to achieve an accurate 
verdict. The outcome of the chosen strategies is the profit ΠR and ΠW for Mr. Right and 
Mr. Wrong, and the utility UJ for the judge. Equilibrium strategies can be identified via 
backward induction. 
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Figure 1: Setup of the Litigation Game. 
3.2 Stage 2: the Judge 
In a civil law regime, the judge plays are more active role in solving the case (inquisitorial 
system). He processes the factual evidence brought forward by the litigants, but also 
interrogates witnesses or inquires expert assessment on complicated technical or medical 
matters. In addition to the assessment of the facts to a case, the judge is also to interpret the 
applying legal rules. Given that abstract legal rules never perfectly fit a real world problem, 
the interpretation of the law is difficult and requires judicial effort. Eventually, the judge 
renders a professional opinion based on the provided evidence and the law. 
We assume that the judge is motivated to solve a given case correctly, and receives a benefit 
B out of an accurate decision. Thus, he should plainly decide in favor of Mr. Right in our 
model. However, the judicial effort to evaluate the case correctly exhibits diminishing 
marginal returns, as it becomes more and more exhausting to further increase the 
probability of a correct decision. Furthermore, there are marginal costs mc of the judicial 
effort. The higher the marginal costs mc, the more time the judge requires for a given 
increase in accuracy. Marginal costs may be affected by case complexity, imprecision of 
legal rules or previous jurisdiction on a similar case. The maximization problem for the 
judge then is 
max!)()(
JJ
mcJ
WRJ
RJBJU 
      (1) 
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Consider that the availability of precedents θ negatively affect marginal costs. If there is a 
previous court decision to a comparable case, this provides a line of legal argumentation and 
exemplified requirements on factual evidence for the judge. By following the precedent, 
the judge saves resources (thus costs) for a given level of effort, as he does not have to 
logically deduce the legal assessment himself, consider legal doctrines or a hypothetical 
intent of the lawmaker. 
The First-Order-Condition then yields the optimal judicial effort J* with 
R
W
mc
BRW
WRJ

 )(),(*        (2) 
A maximizing judge would thus increase effort, if marginal costs mc diminish. We find it 
plausible to assume that precedents reduces marginal costs. The judge will then be able to 
compare the facts of the case at hand to the previous jurisdiction. The result is a higher 
accuracy (in accordance with the precedence5). Judicial effort also increases if the 
motivation of the judge for a correct decision B is higher. Function (2) also shows how the 
judge optimally reacts to an increase in effort by Mr. Right and Mr. Wrong. One would 
assume that a judge would gradually increase his effort in order to restore accuracy if Mr. 
Wrong spends more resources on the case. Similarly, it appears plausible that a judge could 
reduce his effort if Mr. Right spends more resources and thus “proves the case himself”. 
While this is indeed largely the reaction of the judge described here, note however that this 
result is not general. If Mr. Right exerts very little effort, but Mr. Wrong further and further 
increases his use of resources, marginal costs exceed marginal benefit and it becomes 
optimal for the judge to invest less in the case.  
  
                                                 
5 We assert that the precedent itself is efficient. Given jurisprudence constante, such a precedent will require 
that there is a certain degree of uniformity among courts in judging a particular case. Given that unbiased 
courts decide correctly more often than they err, such a uniformity should develop in favor of Mr. Right. 
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3.3 Stage 1: Rent-Seeking 
The litigants will form rational expectations about the behavior of the judge. Given a 
disputed value D (the “rent”), Mr. Right and Mr. Wrong decide simultaneously how much 
effort they put into the case. Consider that both parties now can make an estimate of the 
amount of resources spent by the opposing party. Given this setup, the expected returns of 
Mr. Right, ΠR, and Mr. Wrong, ΠW, can be described as the following maximization 
problems: 
max!),(
),()(
*
*
RR
R
WRWRJ
RWRJDR 
     (3) 
max!),()( * WW WWRWRJ
WDW      (4) 
Inserting the optimal judicial effort J*(R,W) into (3) and differentiating with respect to R 
yields the First-Order Condition, which gives the reaction function for Mr. Right, R*(W).  
3
2
*
)(
4
1
)(
B
mcWD
WR

       (5) 
The interpretation for Mr. Right is straightforward: he increases his litigation effort if the 
value in dispute D is higher or if his adversary, Mr. Wrong, invests more. The same applies 
for Mr. Right if the judge is less motivated to achieve accuracy and Mr. Right has to exert 
more effort to substantiate his claim. Also, higher marginal costs of the judge imply less 
judicial effort and require Mr. Right to invest more resources. 
Inserting J*(R,W) into (4) and differentiating with respect to W delivers the First-Order 
Condition for Mr. Wrong and gives the reaction function, W*(R). 
 
RB
mcDRW 

4
)()(
2
*         (6) 
Mr. Wrong will also increase his litigation effort if the disputed value D is higher or if the 
judge is less dedicated to achieve accuracy. Again, higher marginal costs of the judge lead 
to higher effort. In contrast to traditional rent-seeking models, however, Mr. Wrong will 
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also spend less resources on litigation if Mr. Right increases his effort. The reason lies in the 
externality of the endogenous enforcement mechanism: if Mr. Wrong also increases his 
effort, this is costly to him and also provokes the judge to better evaluate the case, which is 
favorable to Mr. Right. If Mr. Wrong reduces his efforts, this saves costs and leads to less 
judicial dedication, which weakens the position of his adversary. 
3.4 Outcome 
The Nash-equilibrium of the litigation game is the mutual combination of best responses by 
Mr. Right and Mr. Wrong. Solving (6) for R and equating with (5) yields the equilibrium 
effort 
B
mcD
RW
2
)(**       (7) 
If the litigants play the equilibrium strategies, the total amount of resources spent in 
litigation, W*+R*, positively depend on the marginal costs of the evaluating judge. If a 
precedent is available for the tried case, marginal costs for the judge decrease. Equation (7) 
shows that a precedent is thus beneficial because it leads to fewer resources spent in 
equilibrium. Fig. 2 illustrates this effect: due to the precedent, the reaction functions of Mr. 
Right and Mr. Wrong shift from RF1 to RF2, thereby decreasing equilibrium rent-seeking 
effort. Furthermore, a precedent also leads to an increase in accuracy of the court. Given 
the equilibrium strategies R*, W* and J* of the three players, the probability of a correct 
verdict (in favor of Mr. Right) can be calculated as 
B
mc )(1  . A decrease in marginal costs 
for the judge (or a higher motivation for a correct decision) increases the probability that 
Mr. Right wins. 
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Figure 2. The Effect of a Precedent on Time Spent for Rent-Seeking. 
As indicated above, we interpret all resources invested by the parties as time consuming. 
Consequently, a reduction in total effort means a reduction in time consumed by litigation. 
We find it reasonable to suspect that this effect (at least partially) transfers into a reduction 
of case disposition time. If strategic behavior of the litigants is a cause for slow court 
proceedings, precedents effectively restrict rent-seeking opportunities in courtroom and 
thus should lead to less delay.  
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4. Data 
Trial courts typically bear the brunt in civil litigation. In 2014, there were 1,107,028 new 
court proceedings filed at the German civil courts of first instance (Amtsgericht).6 While 
the total number of lawsuits has been declining recently, average disposition time increased 
to 192 days that year (see CEPEJ 2016). First instance courts primarily evaluate the facts of 
a case, and apply the law made by the legislator and specified by higher courts. 
Consequently, we suspect that first instance courts will benefit the most from available 
precedents with respect to shorter disposition time. In order to gain empirical evidence on 
such effects, we use a dataset of civil litigation from a medium-sized trial court in Hamburg. 
The data is a random draw out of all cases that were filed at the court in 2009, and consists 
of 2,360 full case records.7 However, we had to drop cases that were resolved without a 
judicial verdict, e.g. via default judgment (37 percent), withdrawal (24 percent) or in-court 
settlement (12 percent).8 The final sample thus consists of 576 first instance court rulings. 
In 140 cases, the decision was appealed. Litigants later withdrew 54 appeals without a final 
decision of the higher instance court. Eventually, the appeals court confirmed the first 
instance verdict in 77 cases, and overruled it in only nine cases. 
Length of court proceedings is identified by the count variable DURATION (n1=576 cases), 
which measures disposition time in months. Average disposition time in our sample is 
slightly above six months and thus very close to the above reported country average of the 
sample year. If an appeal to a verdict was admitted and filed, the outcome is captured by 
the binary variable REVERSAL (n2=86), which equals one if the first instance verdict was 
overruled and zero otherwise.  
                                                 
6 See STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT (2016a) for some general details on court proceedings in Germany. 
7 The year 2009 was the most complete caseload in the court archive. Most procedures had been concluded, 
and the records were still stowed at the trial court.  
8 We cannot rule out that precedents had an effect on the litigants of dropped cases. However, without a court 
verdict, there is no credible information on the existence of a precedent. 
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As control variables, we employ certain characteristics of the tried case. The controls 
P_ADVOCATE and D_ADVOCATE reveal if an advocate represented the plaintiff and the 
defendent in front of the court. Furthermore, we identify whether the litigants are 
individuals or a corporate identity, which is captured by the dummy variable P_FIRM and 
D_FIRM. The specific subfield of law of a case, like contract law, tenancy law, traffic law 
or tort law, is also represented with dummy variables. We know the value in dispute 
(VALUE) and whether a case included an oral hearing (ORAL). The variable 
CORRESPONDENCE captures the intensity of party correspondence to the court, and may 
be a good proxy for the party´s aggressiveness. The dummy APPEALABILITY identifies if 
a first instance ruling could be appealed at the higher court level. Lastly, we control for the 
extent of the court´s legal grounds when documenting its decision.  
There is no objective measure of precedents to a legal dispute, thus we have to focus on 
judicial citation as a proxy that precedents existed.9 Several variables indicate the use of 
citations in the legal grounds of the verdict. The dummy PRECEDENTS equals one if the 
judge cited a precedent in a given case. PRECEDENTS_No indicates the amount of 
precedents cited, and PRECEDENTS_Age how many years the latest precedent cited in the 
ruling had already existed. Likewise, we control for the citation of legal LITERATURE, like 
specialist books or textbooks. LEGALNORMS_No identifies the amount of references to 
legal norms in the grounds of the verdict. 
  
                                                 
9 This is a natural caveat of legal research. However, we believe that judges will tend to cite precedents if they 
are available, as this lies in their own interests. As citation patterns may differ between judges, we will apply 
a fixed effect model.  
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Variable Description Mean Median Min Max 
      
response:      
DURATION months between filing and first-instance verdict 6.19 5 0 42 
REVERSAL (dummy) Trial court verdict was overruled in appeal process 0.10    
      
controls:      
P_ADVOCATE (dummy) Plaintiff is represented by an advocate 0.92    
P_FIRM (dummy) Plaintiff is a firm or organization 0.44    
D_ADVOCATE (dummy) Defendant is represented by an advocate 0.73    
D_FIRM (dummy) Defendant is a firm or organization 0.33    
CORRESPONDENCE Party correspondence to court (pages) 70.25 49 1 414 
VALUE Value in dispute (Euro) 1838 1046 12 40,000 
CONTRACTS (dummy) Case in the field of contract law 0.51    
TORTS (dummy) Case in the field of tort law 0.04    
TENANCY (dummy) Case in the field of tenancy law 0.22    
TRAFFIC (dummy) Case in the field of traffic law 0.17    
OTHER (dummy) Case in other field of law 0.05    
ORAL (dummy) Oral hearing were held  0.76    
APPEALABILITY (dummy) Verdict can be appealed 0.66    
GROUNDS Legal grounds as presented in verdict (words) 700 576 0 4968 
      
citations:      
PRECEDENTS (dummy) Precedents were cited 0.42    
PRECEDENTS_No Number of precedents cited 1.41 0 0 20 
PRECEDENTS_Age Age of latest precedent cited in years 6.53 4 0 56 
LITERATURE (dummy) Legal literature was cited 0.30    
LEGALNORMS_No Number of legal norms cited 8.50 7 0 40 
            
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Dataset. 
  
16 
 
5.  Regression Results 
5.1 Precedents and Disposition time 
We apply a Poisson regression model to study the impact factors on case disposition time. 
As our response (DURATION) is a count variable, the Poisson distribution appears 
reasonable (see, e.g. CAMERON/TRIVEDI 2009, FAHRMEIR et al. 2013). As a Poisson regression 
on our data might suffer from overdispersion10, we estimate model (I) with robust standard 
errors. The literature (see, e.g. KLEIBER/ZEILEIS 2008, CHRISTENSEN/SZMER 2012) also 
proposes an alternative way to account for overdispersion in the data, and then recommends 
a negative binomial regression model. In order to check for the robustness of our results, 
we report the results from this alternative regression in model (II). To control for judge-
specific effects, we estimate all models with fixed effects.  
Table 2 presents the regression results. Both models yield consistent results with only slight 
variation in the calculated coefficients and significance levels. As a further robustness 
check, we repeat both estimations with a reduced model that only contains the previously 
significant variables. The results remain qualitatively the same. 
Seven variables of the controls show a significant effect on case disposition time. Any legal 
representation by advocates increases the duration of disputes. While this effect is even 
more pronounced for advocates on the plaintiff side, it turns insignificant in the negative 
binomial regression. It is not surprising that the use of legal representation in court is time 
consuming per se, as advocates have to be instructed by their clients. Furthermore, legal 
representation may create an agency problem, as advocates are usually less interested in 
short proceedings. Litigation is however significantly shorter if the plaintiff is a firm or 
corporate identity. For the defendant party, this effect is close to zero and insignificant. We 
                                                 
10 A specific assumption of the Poisson distribution is equidispersion, meaning that the variance equals the 
mean. The factor by which variance exceeds the mean of a given distribution is the dispersion parameter. If 
we apply a quasi-Poisson model, we find a dispersion parameter of 1.63 (z-value: 3.09). It is thus beneficial to 
account for overdispersion by either applying robust standard errors or negative binomial regression. 
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find this plausible, as firms are both more rational in filing suits and typically well 
experienced in preparing court proceedings. Due to the advantage of the first move, this 
effect should be more pronounced for the plaintiff. Firms are also more able to control the 
potential agency problem, either by internal legal departments or by long-term contracts 
with a law firm. Furthermore, the extent of party correspondence has a highly significant 
impact and increases the length of proceedings. More correspondence to the court implies 
higher party effort, which is time consuming, and turns a legal matter also more 
complicated for the judge.  
With respect to court procedures, oral hearings significantly increase disposition time. We 
deem this plausible as oral hearings have to be scheduled, and the available time and 
adequate courtrooms are typically scarce. In addition, cases that can be appealed lead to 
significantly longer disposition time. We presume that litigants exert more effort in such 
proceedings in order to gain a favorable position for a potential appeal. Appealable cases 
also generally imply a higher value in dispute. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that 
appealability will have an effect on how the judge runs the proceedings.11 The different 
subfields of law indicate a slightly positive but highly insignificant effect with respect to 
the reference category of contract law cases.12 VALUE and GROUNDS show no sizable 
effect on the duration of lawsuits. The few other studies on court micro data have found 
similar determinants of disposition time, which supports the general fit of our model.13 
                                                 
11 In BERLEMANN/CHRISTMANN (2016), we show that judges exert more effort in cases they expect to be 
appealed later. 
12 The case category OTHER is a catch-all variable for cases that did not fit into the four previously defined 
categories. It primarily contains injunctions, which would well explain why these proceedings show a 
negative effect. However, we refrain from interpreting this result here. 
13 The positive effect of legal representation on trial duration was also identified by GRAJZL/ZAJC (2016) and 
DALTON (2009), but not significant in BIELEN et al. (2016). CHRISTENSEN/SZMER (2012) find a positive effect of 
oral procedures on disposition time. Bielen et al. (2015b) show that more pleadings of the parties lead to longer 
proceedings. 
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Both regression models indicate that the existence of precedents show a highly significant 
and negative effect on case disposition time. Thus, proceedings that were resolved with 
reference to previous jurisdiction were significantly shorter than legal disputes without 
available precedents. Interestingly, this effect does not exist for textbook literature, which 
is also frequently cited by judges. We also find a positive and significant effect for the 
citation of legal norms. We suppose that a longer, more intricate line of judicial 
argumentation may require additional references to the law. Consequently, one could 
assume that the use of legal norms is positively correlated to the (unobserved) legal 
complexity, and thus to the duration of the lawsuit. In this interpretation, precedents would 
reduce the (unobserved) legal complexity. 
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  Model (I) Model (II) 
Variable Coefficient z-Value Coefficient z-Value 
        
Response: DURATION DURATION 
     
controls:       
P_ADVOCATE 0.177** 2.21 0.155 1.58 
P_FIRM -0.142** -2.26 -0.123** -2.33 
D_ADVOCATE 0.133* 1.89 0.138** 2.10 
D_FIRM 0.001 0.02 0.005 0.09 
CORRESPONDENCE 0.004*** 7.95 0.005*** 11.37 
VALUE 0.000 -0.34 0.000 -0.24 
TORTS 0.140 1.50 0.154 1.37 
TENANCY 0.024 0.29 0.014 0.23 
TRAFFIC 0.040 0.56 0.036 0.52 
OTHER -0.366*** -3.55 -0.351*** -2.75 
ORAL 0.191** 2.14 0.198** 2.37 
APPEALABILITY 0.292*** 4.00 0.279*** 3.86 
GROUNDS 0.000 0.51 0.000 0.39 
        
citations:       
PRECEDENTS -0.172** -2.56 -0.166*** -3.14 
LITERATURE 0.045 0.77 0.051 0.94 
LEGALNORMS_No 0.011* 1.66 0.012** 1.98 
         
Regression POISSON, ROBUST SE NEGATIVE BINOMIAL 
Fixed Effects YES YES 
Oberservations 576 576 
Adj. R² (McFadden) 0.10 0.11 
          
Remarks:     
Significance levels: '***'<0.01; '**'<0.05; '*'<0.1   
Table 2. Regression Results. 
5.2 The Use of Precedents 
We find that the reference to previous court decisions significantly reduces case disposition 
time. In a civil law country, the doctrine of jurisprudence constante describes the 
emergence of repeated and uniform court verdicts over time, which create a persuasive 
impact on future judicial decisions. The impact of precedents should then be strongest if 
numerous identical court decisions exist and those decisions have been unchallenged for a 
long time. In the following, we will explore such a qualitative dimension of a precedent 
citation on court delay.  
It appears reasonable to assume that the existence of several and identical court decisions 
provide more guidance to the judge. For the litigants, it also becomes more likely that the 
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party (or their advocates) are aware of the existing previous jurisdiction. We would thus 
speculate that the number of precedents should show a negative effect on the length of a 
trial. Furthermore, a precedent that has prevailed over many years and is still in place 
should form a stronger signal to the litigants and the judge than a recent decision of another 
court. More specifically, it becomes more likely that an old, yet unchallenged precedent 
will guide appellate courts, if the trial judges decides to depart from the precedent, and 
litigants file an appeal.  
Given this intuition, we modify our Poisson regression model: In model (III), we include 
the variable PRECEDENTS_No in order to reveal the effect of the number of cited 
precedents on trial duration. In model (IV), we limit our analysis to cases with precedent 
citation, and include PRECEDENT_Age into the regression. Our findings are presented in 
table 3. The results are, again, qualitatively unchanged in a negative binomial regression. 
While the coefficient of PRECEDENTS_No has the expected sign, the effect is far from 
significant in both models. As presumed, we find a negative effect of the age of a precedent 
on case disposition time (model IV), but, again, the result remains statistically insignificant. 
We conclude that it is neither the number nor the age of cited precedents, but mainly the 
sheer availability of previous court decisions that creates the impact on litigation time.  
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 Model (III) Model (IV) 
Variable Coefficient z-Value Coefficient z-Value 
        
Response: DURATION DURATION 
    
 
citations:       
PRECEDENTS -0.144** -2.13   
PRECEDENTS_No -0.010 -0.91 -0.008 -0.75 
PRECEDENTS_Age     -0.004 -1.05 
LITERATURE 0.042 0.73 0.100 1.55 
LEGALNORMS_No 0.012* 1.70 0.006 0.88 
        
        
Regression Poisson, robust SE Poisson, robust SE 
Fixed Effects YES YES 
Controls YES YES 
Observations 576 241 
Adj. R² (McFadden) 0.11 0.12 
Remarks:     
Significance levels: '***'<0.01; '**'<0.05; '*'<0.1  
Table 3. Use of Precedents. 
5.3 Precedents and the Probability of Error 
Another outcome of our theoretical model was the positive effect of a precedent on court 
accuracy. In other words, if precedents exist, then judges will commit fewer errors when 
deciding a case. From an empirical perspective, however, it cannot be determined which 
cases were decided correctly. Following the literature (see, among others, LEVY 2005, 
SHAVELL 2010), we will regard the decision of the appeal court as a proxy for correctness. 
Consequently, a confirmation by the higher court implies that the trial judge decided 
correctly, and reversal indicates judicial error. 
As our explanatory variable REVERSAL (n2 = 86 cases) is binary, we apply a logistic 
regression with judge fixed effects in order to examine a potential impact of precedent 
citation on the probability of reversal.14 The regression results (model V) are displayed in 
table 4. 
                                                 
14 We apply the same set of controls except for APPEALABILITY. This variable is dropped, as all appealed 
cases were in fact appealable in our data. 
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We find indeed that precedent citation shows a negative effect on the probability of 
reversal. This effect is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level. This result 
fits into the conclusions from our theoretical model: precedents serve as a guidance to trial 
judges when evaluating a case, and this reduces error. Furthermore, the existence of 
precedents indicates how other courts have previously decided, and what to expect from 
the appeal court. Furthermore, the citation of literature in a court verdict has a positive and 
significant impact. The interpretation of this effect is less straightforward. We suppose that 
judges cite textbooks and comparable literature more often when the interpretation of law 
and facts is rather ambiguous, and precedents are unavailable. Higher courts may also 
intentionally decide to express dissent with the cited literature as they make law. Given the 
limited number of observations on appeals and the comparably low confidence level, these 
findings should be considered as ‘tentative’. 
  Model (V) 
Variable Coefficient z-Value 
     
Response: REVERSAL 
   
citations:    
PRECEDENTS -6.202* -1.84 
LITERATURE 5.052* 1.91 
LEGALNORMS_No 0.086 0.25 
      
Regression Logistic 
Fixed Effects YES 
Controls YES 
Observations 86 
Adj. R² (McFadden) 0.27 
Remarks:   
Significance levels: '***'<0.01; '**'<0.05; '*'<0.1 
Table 4. Precedents and Probability of Reversal. 
6. Conclusions 
The relevance of a coherent jurisdiction for the timely resolution of legal disputes has so far 
received surprisingly little attention by law and economics scholars. For civil law countries, 
the doctrine of jurisprudence constante describes the persuasive power of subsequent 
analogous court decisions on future judicial decision-making. Understanding this impact of 
legal precedents on the behavior of litigants and trial judges is thus a prerequisite for the 
23 
 
adequate assessment of court delay. This paper aims at closing this gap in the literature, and 
to our knowledge provides first empirical evidence on the role of legal precedents for case 
disposition time and the probability of reversal in a civil law country.  
As a theoretical reference, we employ a two-stage rent seeking game between the litigants 
and the judge. At the first stage, the litigants choose their level of effort simultaneously. 
Higher effort implies a higher use of the resource time, and increases ceteris paribus the 
probability of winning the case. At the second stage, the judge exerts costly effort to render 
a correct decision contingent on the previous party behavior. We presume that under a 
precedent it becomes easier for the judge to evaluate an analogous case correctly. Rational 
litigants then react strategically to this increased judicial accuracy. We find that the extent 
of possible rent seeking in court is considerably reduced if precedents exist. This suggests 
that the availability of previous jurisdiction to a given case decreases case disposition time 
by curbing the socially wasteful strategic behavior in courtroom.  
We then apply judge-level data from a German trial court to examine the hypothesized 
effects. Applying a poisson regression model on the duration of legal disputes, we find that 
legal precedents, which were cited in a judicial verdict, show a statistically significant 
impact and reduce the length of trial. Interestingly, this effect appears to rely on the mere 
existence of precedents, as we find no empirical evidence that the number of cited 
precedents or the age of a precedent make a difference. The data also allows us to draw some 
inference on the relevance of precedents for the outcome of appeals. Judges who cited 
precedents in the legal grounds to their verdict were significantly less likely to be reversed 
by the higher court. Assuming that appeal courts are interested in the reduction of judicial 
error and that they are at least equally competent as the lower courts, we suggest that the 
use of precedents also increases the accuracy of court decisions. 
Our empirical results further substantiate the debate on the efficiency effects of judge-made 
law and the evolution of judicial precedents in civil law countries. While common theories 
compare the evolution of precedents to capital accumulation models (see, e.g., 
FON/PARISI 2006), we reveal sizable effects of precedents on the performance of trial courts. 
Our analysis also provides testable predictions for future research. Based on this study, we 
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suppose that the varying availability of precedents in the different subfields of law may 
cause a diverging intensity of delay. Dynamic legal fields with few precedents (and 
legislation) should thus be more prone to delay and congestion problems. Our findings also 
put into perspective a legal policy that promotes settlements. A higher settlement rate may 
reduce the caseload of courts, but possibly hampers the production of precedents, and thus 
could even produce a longer duration of tried cases. 
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